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Ownership, Capital Structure and Financing Decision: Evidence 
from the UK 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether and to what degree agency conflicts in ownership structure 
affect firm leverage ratios and external financing decisions, using a universal sample of UK 
firms from 1998 to 2012. We use two distinctive measures to capture ownership structure, 
namely, managerial share ownership (MSO) and institutional ownership. Our empirical results 
show a non-monotonic relation between MSO and the debt ratio, supporting two competing 
theories: interest alignment theory and the management entrenchment hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
institutional ownership is found to be positively related to firm leverage levels. Our results 
further suggest that firms with concentrated MSO decrease their leverage by increasing the 
probability of issuing equity over bonds, an effect strengthened during hot market periods. 
 
Keywords: ownership, capital structure, market valuation, security issuance, agency theory. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In corporate governance, ownership structure is a crucial instrument in alleviating agency 
problems. Previous research (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Morck et al., 1988) provides 
evidence that agency conflicts in ownership structure have an impact on firm performance, 
but only a handful of studies look into how ownership structure affects firm capital structure 
by considering agency problems. This paper examines whether and to what degree agency 
conflicts in ownership structure affects firm leverage ratios and external financing decisions, 
using a universal sample of UK firms from 1998 to 2012. 
 
A vibrant strand of capital structure research follows Jensen and Meckling (1976) in using 
owner–manager agency conflict to argue that managers make capital structure decisions to 
promote their own wealth, such that their behavior does not maximize firm value. Debt is a 
disciplining device that can be used to alleviate such agency problems by constraining 
management overinvestment behavior (Grossman and Hart, 1980, Jensen, 1986). In this case, 
entrenched managers who have discretion over capital structure choice pursue lower debt 
levels to avoid the disciplining role of debt. Further, they have an incentive to protect their 
under-diversified human capital from bankruptcy risk associated with debt (Jensen, 1986; 
Friend and Lang, 1988). Zwiebel (1996) further argues that entrenched managers only issue 
debt as a defensive device to commit sufficient value when their empire building is threatened 
by potential takeover and dismissal. Consistent with this argument, Berger et al. (1997) find 
that firm debt levels increase following entrenchment-reducing events, such as involuntary 
CEO turnover, unsuccessful tender offers, and the arrival of a new board of directors. 
However, Harris and Raviv (1991) and Stulz (1988) suggest that entrenched managers prefer 
more than the optimal amount of debt to inflate their equity voting power and avoid takeover 
threats. Given these inconsistent views of the influence of managerial incentive on firm debt 
levels, the first goal of this study is to explore how MSO influences the capital structure 
decisions of firms and provide further insight into the predictions above. 
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Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out that the presence of an external blockholder 
can help dampen the effect resulting from standard owner–manager conflicts of interest, since 
concentrated ownership leads to intense managerial monitoring. An active monitoring 
mechanism can limit the scale of managerial opportunism and resolve the issue of managers 
adjusting the capital structure of firms to serve their own interests. Institutional shareholders, 
by virtue of their large shareholdings, have stronger incentives and better skills to monitor 
management relative to minority shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980).
1
 This is because 
they can enjoy greater benefits through monitoring and have greater voting power against 
financial policies that reduce shareholder wealth (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2006; Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In this case, the cost of debt should be lower in 
firms with higher institutional ownership. Given this viewpoint, the second goal of this study 
is to examine whether the presence of institutional shareholders encourages firms to choose 
debt as a governance mechanism to constrain managerial entrenchment. 
 
Proper management of firm ownership structure can have a significant effect on firm leverage 
levels, echoing the argument of Brailsford et al. (2002), Florackis and Ozkan (2009), and 
Friend and Lang (1988). Such an effect is generally imposed via a firm’s external financing 
activities, since, in practice, security issues and proceeds are used to directly affect capital 
structure. Therefore, this paper further examines the role of ownership structure on the 
external financing decisions of firms, using a dataset of UK bond and equity issues. Our study 
is in line with recent work by Lundstrum (2009), who investigates 111 financing offerings of 
US firms and finds a positive relation between MSO and a decline in leverage after issuance. 
 
In addition, the literature suggests that market valuation interplays with ownership structure in 
determining leverage levels and external financing policies. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue 
that firms raise external funds when their cost of equity is temporarily low and that previous 
equity issues have a long-lasting impact on leverage. Welch (2004) states that the fluctuation of 
a firm’s own stock price is one of the primary determinants of capital structure changes. For 
                                                 
1 The literature recognizes that individual investors who own a small fraction of shares expect others to take 
responsibility for monitoring, because their cost of monitoring is generally much higher than their returns (Grossman 
and Hart, 1980). 
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example, a firm’s stock price is likely to be overvalued because of rising demand from investors 
under hot market conditions. This naturally leads to MSO diffusion due to equity issues and 
share selling and thus lowers debt levels. In this line, Pedersen and Thomsen (2000) consider 
stock market valuation a probable determinant of firm ownership structure. However, the 
relation and, more specifically, the directions of the relation between market valuation, 
ownership structure, and external financing decisions are far from conclusive (e.g., Florackis 
and Ozkan, 2009; Pedersen and Thomsen, 2000). The third goal of this paper is to examine the 
moderating effect of market valuation on the relation between ownership structure and external 
financing channels. 
 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, this paper starts by recreating 
earlier findings of the relation between ownership and firm leverage (e.g., Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009; Lundstrum, 2009). However, in addition to MSO, our analysis considers 
institutional ownership a key measure that leads to a more complete capture of ownership 
structure. In contrast to the work of Lundstrum (2009), our analysis focuses on UK listed 
firms. The UK market provides an interesting context for our study: UK firms are generally 
characterized as having widely dispersed ownership, with a growing concentration of 
institutional holdings. Short and Keasey (1999) suggest that, compared to the US market, UK 
managers become more entrenched at higher levels of ownership and institutional investors 
are better able to coordinate their monitoring activities. Additionally, UK bankruptcy law 
strictly enforces creditor rights against management and equity holders when a firm succumbs 
to financial distress (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, managers in UK firms are more 
conservative in debt issuance, although strict enforcement reduces the cost of debt. 
 
Second, we extend the study of Lundstrum (2009) by investigating whether and to what 
degree MSO, or institutional ownership, affects the external financing policies of firms, 
including the choice between bond and equity issues and the size of the issue. Moreover, 
unlike Lundstrum, we consider the relation between ownership and financing decisions under 
different market valuations. It is hypothesized that hot and cold market valuations limit 
managerial entrenchment and hence lower agency costs. We argue that both managers and 
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institutional shareholders benefit (suffer) from equity issuance because of the lower (higher) 
costs of equity in hot (cold) markets. To address this issue, we explicitly take into account 
different (hot/cold) market valuations to interact with firm ownership proxies and assess their 
impact on external financing decisions. 
 
Our study also addresses how the recent financial crisis has influenced the capital structure 
and financial decisions of firms, given that managerial and shareholder interests are naturally 
aligned and owner–manager conflicts over risk choice vanish with the threat of firm 
bankruptcy. In this setting, both managers and institutional investors are more concerned with 
firm survival; thereby, firms are more likely to lower their leverage levels by issuing equity 
over bonds. This study provides strong empirical evidence to support this argument. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and sets forth 
the arguments underlying the main hypotheses. Section 3 presents our sample selection and 
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the main findings of the empirical analysis. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Hypothesis Development 
 
Due to the different incentives of various investors, our study develops several hypotheses 
regarding the effects of MSO and institutional ownership on the capital structure decisions of 
firms. 
 
2.1. MSO and Capital Structure Decisions 
 
A considerable body of research from the managerial perspective suggests that the financing 
decisions of firms are greatly influenced by their managers’ objectives, desires, and preferences 
(e.g., Jensen, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Zwiebel, 1996). 
Jensen (1986) argues that the managerial moral hazard problem has a significant effect on 
capital structure decisions. To pursue growth, managers may engage in projects with negative 
6 
net present value (NPV), particularly if the firm has a large amount of free cash flow after 
financing all positive-NPV projects. The obligations associated with debt can reduce such free 
cash available for managers’ personal wealth (Grossman and Hart, 1980). Nevertheless, 
managers may avoid debt to preserve their managerial opportunism, consistent with empirical 
evidence that firms with stronger managerial control power tend to use less debt (Berger et al., 
1997). 
 
In the model of Zwiebel (1996), entrenched managers adopt a capital structure by trading off 
empire-building ambitions with the need to ensure sufficient efficiency and to prevent control 
challenges. On the one hand, managers voluntarily issue debt to restrict themselves, using 
potential bankruptcy as a way to commit credibly and to forgo inefficient investment, thereby 
preventing a takeover. As such, issuing debt implies that a firm is committed to undertake 
operating improvements and can generate sufficient earnings to repay its debt (Leland and 
Pyle, 1977). Berger et al. (1997) find that entrenched managers raise debt when managerial 
security is challenged by the possibility of failure in tender offers or involuntary CEO 
replacement. On the other hand, Zwiebel (1996) proposes that self-interested managers will 
decrease debt levels to avoid the disciplining role of debt and the threat of a bankruptcy. Since 
managers bear non-diversifiable employment risk linked to firm survival, bankruptcy or 
financial distress will result in their demotion or loss of employment (Brailsford et al., 2002; 
Friend and Lang, 1988). In this context, risk-averse managers are more reluctant to raise firm 
debt levels to protect their undiversified human capital. 
 
According to two competing theories, interest alignment theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
and managerial entrenchment theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), some studies find a curvilinear 
relation between MSO and leverage (e.g., Brailsford et al., 2002; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). 
When MSO is relatively low, increasing debt levels can reduce managerial incentives to 
engage in non-optimal activities and thereby align managerial and shareholder interests. 
Under this scenario, managers use debt financing to alleviate the agency cost of free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986) and thereby retain control (Zwiebel, 1996). However, when MSO surpasses a 
“changeover” point, managers have more discretion adjusting debt levels in their own interest 
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(Brailsford et al., 2002). Such entrenched managers have more incentive to lower firm debt 
levels, to avoid the pressure of interest payment commitments (Jensen, 1986), and to reduce 
bankruptcy risk and the associated loss of entrenchment (Zwiebel, 1996). Therefore, we 
propose the following hypothesis. 
 
H1a: The relation between MSO and firm leverage is non-monotonic. This relation is positive 
for lower degrees of MSO and negative at higher degrees. 
 
Using the underlying agency theory and following the survey evidence to date (e.g., Berger et 
al. 1997; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), we expect a strong linkage between managerial 
ownership and the choice between equity and bonds. 
 
In the adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984), managers choose bond issues 
over equity issues to reduce the underinvestment problem. This problem is caused by the 
presence of information asymmetry, where existing shareholders are more informed about the 
value of a firm than new investors are. Assuming that managers act in the interest of existing 
shareholders, they only finance a new project by issuing equity if the firm lacks internal funds 
or the growth opportunity is risky. As a result, new shares are underpriced by the market. 
Firms will reject even positive-NPV projects if the underpricing of new capital is higher than 
the value of the project. This underinvestment can be reduced by funding the project using a 
financing method that is less likely to be mispriced by the market. Therefore, managers will 
consider internal funds a first choice, followed by debt issues, and equity issues as a last resort, 
as suggested by pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 
Nevertheless, contemporary managers are expected to tend to issue equity, based on several 
conjectures. First, regular interest on debt reduces the probability of management 
overinvestment (Jensen, 1986). Second, managers are unwilling to accept monitoring by 
outside debt creditors (Zwiebel, 1996). Third, high debt levels correspond to a high risk of 
financial distress and bankruptcy. Since managers bear non-diversifiable employment risk 
linked to firm survival, bankruptcy or financial distress will result in their demotion or loss of 
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employment (Brailsford et al., 2002; Friend and Lang, 1988). In other words, when loss of 
control is less of a concern, firms are more likely to fund their growth with equity issues. We 
propose the following hypothesis. 
 
H1b: A firm with higher MSO is likely to choose equity over bond financing to secure external 
funds. 
 
2.2. Institutional Ownership and Capital Structure Decisions 
 
According to the active monitoring hypothesis, the presence of institutional investors can 
mitigate the managerial moral hazard problem by closely monitoring firm performance 
(Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The benefits of monitoring cash flow motivate 
external investors to bear the costs. Compared with individual investors, institutional 
investors can efficiently monitor managers when they have access to various sources of 
information and large stakes in a firm. A high degree of institutional ownership (institutional 
OC) ensures managers will follow corporate strategies in the interests of shareholders (Barclay 
and Warner, 1993; Grossman and Hart, 1980). 
 
In corporate governance, the role of institutional investors is known as institutional shareholder 
activism, which can effectively reduce the costs of debt financing. Typical institutional 
shareholders—pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, and banks—have the 
capacity to monitor and affect investment strategies to their own benefit. Ashbaugh et al. (2006) 
and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find that firms with concentrated institutional ownership 
achieve lower yields and higher ratings on their new bond issues. Klein and Zur (2009) 
document that hedge fund targets usually issue continuous payouts in the form of interest 
payments to creditors to reduce the free cash flow problem. Hence their leverage levels are 
higher.
2
 We therefore present the following hypothesis. 
 
H2a: Institutional OC is positively related to firm leverage. 
                                                 
2 Our study examines the relation between the degree of institutional ownership and capital structure. For 
simplicity, we do not consider different types of institutional investors in this paper. 
9 
 
Following the argument above, large institutional holdings are expected to be associated with 
high debt ratios because of the lower cost of debt. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis. 
 
H2b: A firm with high institutional OC is likely to choose bonds over equity financing to secure 
external funds. 
 
2.3. Impact of Market Valuation on the Relation between Ownership and Financing 
Decisions 
 
According to market timing theory, managers time equity offerings to take advantage of the 
temporarily lower cost of equity (e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that high market values, relative to book and past market 
values, are associated with a higher probability of firms issuing equity. They also conclude 
that a firm’s capital structure is the result of cumulative managerial attempts to time equity 
issues. Moreover, Loughran et al. (1994) define market timers as firms that issue equity in a 
hot issue market, characterized by high equity volume. They find that the issuing firm can 
take advantage of such conditions to simultaneously schedule new issues and maximizes issue 
proceeds. Ljungqvist et al. (2006) explain this hot market phenomenon based on investor 
sentiment, where favorable market valuation generates wild bullishness from investors about 
the prospects of issuing firms. Investors are more (less) willing to purchase new shares during 
hot (cold) markets, leading to higher (lower) price reactions than in other periods (Bayless and 
Chaplinsky, 1996). 
 
In addition, entrenched managers may perceive the issue of equity in a hot market as a good 
opportunity to solidify managerial control, due to two conjectures. First, the wealth of 
existing shareholders can be increased by issuing equity upon overvaluation (e.g., Loughran 
and Ritter, 1995; Ljungqvist et al., 2006). Managers can benefit from the equity-based 
compensation (such as options) and the higher reputation in the labor market through lower 
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risks of replacement (Jensen, 2004). Second, hot-market equity issues are associated with 
larger proceeds (Loughran et al., 1994). With discretionary cash flow in hand, managers tend 
to invest excessively to build larger firms or engage in inefficient investments from which 
they can gain more private benefits and perquisites, leading to enhanced empire building (e.g., 
Jensen, 1986, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
Combining the arguments above, we further investigate whether the impact of managerial 
ownership on financing channels via equity or debt varies in accordance with stock market 
valuation. Thus, we further propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: A hot (cold) stock market valuation strengthens (weakens) the effect of MSO on 
the probability of issuing equity. 
 
In this case, existing institutional investors are expected to have the same incentives in their 
financing decisions. Thus we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: A hot (cold) stock market valuation strengthens (weakens) the effect of 
institutional OC on the probability of issuing equity. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection 
 
We obtain accounting and market price data from Datastream for the sample period 1998 to 
2012. We derive information on ownership and security issues from Thomson One Banker. 
When ownership data were missing, we manually collected them from annual company 
reports. We include the equity ownership of managers and large institutional investors for each 
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firm. We exclude observations where the total percentage of all blockholders (O/S% > 3%
3
) 
exceeds 100%. 
 
To examine the impact of ownership on firm leverage, the sample consists of UK firms in the 
FTSE All Share Index. Due to the limited ownership information provided by Thomson One 
Banker, the research period is restricted to 15 years, from 1998 to 2012. The ownership 
dataset represents all firms’ shareholder information for each year, including investor type, 
investment style, and O/S%. We exclude firms in the finance industry (Standard Industrial 
Classification, or SIC, codes 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900–4949) from the 
sample because the leverage ratio in the finance industry differs significantly from that of 
non-financials and the utility industry operates under a tight regulatory regime, with limited 
scope for corporate control. The final overall sample consists of 4,137 firm–year observations 
for 383 firms over 15 years. The missing observations are mainly introduced because of two 
reasons: First, firms are both entering and exiting the FTSE All Share Index during the sample 
period. Second, some firms were missing values and were deleted from recent releases of the 
Thomson One Banker and Datastream databases. 
 
We examine all UK firm bond and equity issues reported by Thomson One Banker over this 
15-year period. Our sample excludes secondary offerings, initial public offerings, convertible 
debt, joint debt and equity offerings, preferred stocks, and serial offerings. After excluding 
financials and utilities firms, we reduce the initial sample size to 4,604 equity offerings and 
1,080 bond offerings. Our study focuses on relatively large offerings,
4
 with issue proceeds 
exceeding £1 million, for a sample of 2,851 equity issues and 940 bond issues. We match 
ownership and firm characteristics with offering activities. The final sample comprises 772 
bond and 530 equity issuances. 
 
                                                 
3 Thomson One Banker defines O/S% as the percentage of total shares outstanding that a shareholder holds of a firm, 
calculated by dividing investor share positions in the firm by the firm’s most recent publicly available total number 
of shares outstanding. 
4 Small equity and bond issuances have less impact on a firm’s overall capital structure and therefore we set the 
cutoff point at £1 million pounds; however, for a robustness test, we also use a £500,000 cutoff and the results remain 
unchanged.  
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3.2. Key Measure Constructs 
 
This study defines MSO as the percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares owned by all executive 
and non-executive directors.
5
 According to Morck et al. (1988) and Lundstrum (2009), we 
classify MSO into three different levels: low, under 5%; medium, 5–25%, and high, above 25%. 
 
Our empirical study defines institutional OC as the proportion of equity owned by institutional 
holders who own at least 3% of the firms’ outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
As displayed by Thomson One Banker, institutions are specified as investment manager 
holders.
6
 
 
In reference to the common concept of a hot market (e.g., Helwege and Liang, 2004), we 
identify the state of the current market by ranking three-month moving averages of scaled 
equity issue volumes. The scaled issue volume is the aggregate equity issue volume divided by 
the month-end value of outstanding equity for the London Stock Exchange. The dummy 
variable Hot (Cold) equals one when the valuation of the current market is in the top (bottom) 
30% of the entire research period and zero otherwise. 
 
We follow Fama and French (2002) in defining a firm’s debt level,  Leverage (market), as the 
book value of debt over the market value. Book debt is total assets minus book equity. Book 
equity is calculated as total assets minus total liabilities plus investment tax credits minus 
preferred stock. Market value is computed as total liabilities minus investment credits plus 
preferred stock and market equity, where market equity is the number of common shares 
outstanding times the stock price. Similar to Florackis and Ozkan (2009), we also use an 
alternative leverage measure, Leverage (book), which is defined as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. 
 
                                                 
5 Our study does not separate non-executive ownership from MSO because of the limitations of the data. 
6 Thomson One Banker defines an investment manager as a buy-side institution that has discretionary power over 
assets under management and that makes buy/sell decisions. 
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3.3. Other Determinants of Capital Structure and Financing Decisions 
 
In addition to ownership structure, other factors that affect firm leverage ratios and external 
financing policies can be grouped by firm-specific characteristics such as tangibility, 
profitability, the market-to-book ratio, sales growth, dividends, non-debt tax shield, and credit 
rating. The effect of each of these variables on capital structure decisions is well documented 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2009). We calculate all of these variables, including 
the ownership constructs above, at the end of the preceding calendar year. 
 
The tangibility of firm assets is closely associated with agency costs of debt and the cost of 
financial distress (Myers, 1977), which is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets.
7
 Firms 
with more tangible assets are better able to secure debt, since these assets can be used as 
collateral (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In the case of liquidation, tangible assets are worth 
more than intangible assets. Hence, bondholders generally demand a lower risk premium. This 
indicates that asset tangibility has a positive effect on leverage (Titman and Wessels, 1988). 
 
We define firm profitability as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
over total assets. More profitable firms have lower costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. 
Moreover, the use of debt as a monitoring mechanism is more likely to solve the free cash flow 
problem (Jensen, 1986). Thus, profitable firms use more debt financing. However, profitable 
firms probably have more internal funding to invest in new projects. Conversely, less profitable 
firms need to resort to debt financing. 
 
We define a firm’s market-to-book ratio as the ratio of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to the book value of assets. The market-to-book ratio is 
the most widely used indicator to predict firm growth opportunities. It can also capture changes 
in leverage brought about by equity mispricing. According to asymmetric information theory, 
overvaluation causes firms to issue equity but, when stock prices are undervalued, they 
                                                 
7 The definition of tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets. 
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purchase shares or issue debt. Therefore firms with higher market-to-book ratios should have 
lower debt levels via equity issuance. 
 
Sales growth is measured by the change in the logarithm of total assets, which is considered an 
alternative measure of firm growth. Typically, low-growth firms can carry more debt in their 
capital structure because they are more secure and stable, incurring lower agency costs of debt. 
On the other hand, high-growth firms may face a more intense debt overhang problem, as 
described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977). In other words, the effect of 
sales growth on leverage is positive. This impact is more significant in small family-owned 
firms, which fear losing control to the bank. 
 
Based on agency and market efficiency theory, a firm’s dividend payout ratio is considered an 
important factor adversely impacting leverage (Rozeff, 1982). However, Chang and Rhee 
(1990) argue that firms with high dividend payout ratios are likely to issue more debt than those 
with low payout ratios. They reason that this is due to the effective capital gain tax rate being 
lower than the dividend tax rate. In the present study, we use the term dividend to express a 
common dividend payout. 
The non-debt tax shield is an inverse proxy for the effect of tax on the leverage ratio (Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). Trade-off theory posits that firms increase their debt to take advantage of 
higher-interest tax shields (Haugen and Senbet, 1987). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
demonstrate that non-debt tax deductions can be used to describe the tax shield benefits of debt. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) further employ the depreciation ratio, net operating loss carry 
forwards, and investment tax credits as proxies for non-debt tax shields. Our regressions define 
the non-debt tax shield as the ratio of depreciation to total assets. 
 
To examine the impact of the recent financial crisis on capital structure, we construct a 
dummy variable, Crisis, that takes the value of one if the issue took place between January 1, 
2007, and December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise. The financial crisis was accompanied by a 
contraction in bank lending to UK non-financial firms and therefore rapid growth in the cost 
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of bank loans. This situation encouraged firms to choose alternative methods to substitute for 
loans. Consistent with this argument, Vera et al. (2011) find that bond and equity issuances in 
the UK increased sharply during the financial crisis, despite elevated price volatility in the 
secondary market. 
 
As discussed earlier, one of the reasons behind a firm’s choice between equity and debt is that 
managers are concerned with the dilution of control arising from equity financing. However, 
Barnes and Walker (2006) find that ownership structure after a rights issue is relatively 
unaltered, while placing allows other investors to purchase new shares, resulting in diffused 
ownership. To consider this issue, following Armitage (2010), this study uses a dummy 
variable, rights, which takes the value of one if a firm use a rights offer or an open offer as 
their equity issue method and zero if it places or uses a combination of a placement and an 
open offer. In a rights-preserving offer, existing shareholders are entitled to preemptive rights 
to purchase new shares in proportion to their holdings. To maintain the control power of the 
firm, large shareholders are expected to pressure the firm into choosing rights-preserving 
offers instead of a placing (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). 
 
The credit rating of a firm is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm’s Standard 
& Poor’s bond rating is above A- and zero if not. This variable is shown only in the regressions 
of bond issuance because it is only available for bond issuers from Thomson One Banker. As 
posited in pecking order theory, firms with higher ratings have fewer adverse selection 
problems, because credit ratings involve information revelation by the rating agency. Firms 
with higher reputations in the debt market may issue more corporate bonds (Denis and Mihov, 
2003). Sufi (2009) further explores Standard & Poor’s credit ratings as a new measure of 
information asymmetry. 
 
To address the endogeneity of ownership variables, we use three determinants of ownership in 
our analysis: firm size, operational risk, and research and development (R&D) expenditure. 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s market valuation. Given that purchasing 
a controlling share in a large firm is much more expensive than purchasing a controlling share 
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in a small firm, a large firm is expected to have dispersed ownership. Using US data, Bathala 
(1996) finds a negative relation between firm size and MSO. The variables for operational 
risk and R&D are used as measures of risk and uncertainty, respectively. Operational risk is 
calculated as the standard deviation of a firm’s profitability over the previous four years, 
while R&D is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditure over total sales. One may expect firms 
taking high risks to be less likely to retain high levels of managerial ownership. Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) state that investment in R&D is a high-risk strategy, so risk-averse managers and 
controlling shareholders are unwilling to spend a great deal on R&D. Additionally, 
Mahrt-Smith (2005) argues that equity in firms with long-term investments is more likely to 
be dispersed, because of the lower share of cash flow rights. 
 
 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for the sample selected from 1998 
to 2012, including MSO, institutional ownership, leverage, profitability, the market-to-book 
ratio, sales growth, tangibility, the dividend payout ratio, and the non-debt tax shield. The 
average MSO level is 9.05%, which is very close to the average level of 10.65% reported by 
Brailsford et al. (2002). The fact that the median MSO is considerably lower than the mean 
(4.60% versus 11.52%, respectively) indicates that firms with lower managerial ownership 
dominate the UK market and the distribution of MSO is fairly skewed. Panel B of Table 1 
confirms this by showing that 53.81% of firm observations have low MSO (i.e., 0–5%). 
Institutional investors hold a significant proportion of total shares in UK firms, 32.63%, on 
average. We observe that the mean level of leverage is 26.64% in the sample of all UK firms. 
This ratio is significantly higher compared with the finding of Florackis and Ozkan (2009) for 
the period from 1999 to 2004. This can be interpreted as UK firms having higher leverage 
ratios due to increased junk bond sales. 
(Please insert Table 1 here) 
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In Table 2, we match firm accounting data with security issues. The final dataset consists of 772 
equity issues and 530 bond issues. Panel A shows the issuance frequency distribution by year. 
We note that equity issues are more frequent than bond issues. Equity and bond issues over the 
sample period raised £300.52 billion and £171.69 billion, respectively, in total. The average 
proceeds of equity issues were quite large during the financial crisis period, from 2007 to 
2010, reaching a peak in 2008, at £873.50 million. The results also show a large increase in 
the number of equity issues by UK firms in 2009. These findings can be explained by the 
large number of firms that tried to reduce their leverage levels and strengthen their balance 
sheets by raising equity capital during the financial crisis. However, equity issues declined 
from 2010 to 2012 due to the surge in underwriting fees. Levis et al. (2011) argue that 
underwriters face high risk when market volatility is high levels and UK firms issued large 
equity issues to recapitalize their fragile balance sheets. 
 
Panel B of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics by issue type and highlights the differences 
across equity and bond issues. The relative offer size of equity (Proceeds/MV)
8
 is higher than 
that in bond issues. Equity issuers appear to have higher MSO and institutional ownership than 
bond issuers. The differences are all statistically significant. These results suggest that firms 
that have higher MSO or institutional ownership rely more on equity than on bond financing, 
consistent with the argument of risk aversion and managerial entrenchment theory. The 
market value of bond issuers, on average, is much greater than that of equity issues, 
suggesting that bond issues tend to cluster in large firms. 
 
The profitability of equity issuers is greater than that for bond issuers (16.76% versus 16.36%, 
respectively). On average, the difference in the sales growth ratio between equity and bond 
issuers is 7.61% and statistically significant. This indicates that equity issues tend to cluster in 
high-growth firms, consistent with the findings of Frank and Goyal (2009). Nevertheless, the 
average market-to-book ratio, dividend, and non-debt tax shield are much higher for bond 
issuers than for equity issuers (3.97% versus 3.21%, 39.71% versus 28.42%, and 3.16% versus 
                                                 
8 Proceed/MV denotes the ratio of issue proceeds over market valuation.  
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2.41%, respectively). Regarding whether equity and bond issues are associated with different 
market valuations, our results indicate that equity issues are more likely to cluster in a favorable 
market. 
 (Please insert Table 2 here) 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
We apply several ordinary least squares (OLS) models to explore the hypotheses developed. 
The first model is a regression to examine how ownership structure impacts firm leverage. The 
second model examines how various levels of MSO affect firm equity–bond choices. In this 
regression, the external financing choice includes not only the likelihood of issuing equity or 
bonds but also the amount of security issue proceeds. The third model tests whether the effect 
of MSO on external financing policy changes under different stock market valuations. 
 
4.1. Ownership and Capital Structure 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the first model, where leverage is regressed against ownership 
measures and other firm characteristics, using the overall sample of UK firm–year observations. 
We use two different definitions of leverage to determine the robustness of our results: book 
and market leverage. Our analysis also includes industry and year dummies to control for 
industry- and time-specific effects, respectively. 
 
In Model 1, the coefficient of MSO (low value) for the market leverage ratio is positive and 
significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficient of MSO squared
 
(high value) is negative and 
significant. This result confirms a non-monotonic relation between leverage and MSO. MSO is 
negatively associated with high debt ratios and positively associated with lower debt ratios. 
Specifically, firms tend to align the interests of managers and shareholders at lower MSO levels 
by choosing a higher level of debt. However, when MSO is high, more entrenched corporate 
managers are likely to pursue their own self-interests, resulting in a lower debt ratio. This 
finding is consistent with the studies of Brailsford et al. (2002) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009). 
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By simple differentiation, we find the turning point of this relation to be around 13%, in the 
median MSO range. That is, the positive relation between ownership and leverage holds up to 
only 13%. The robustness test for book leverage in Model 3 shows consistent results, with a 
turning point around 15%. 
 
To confirm the results in Models 1 and 3, MSO is replaced by three piecewise variables, as in 
Models 2 and 4 (Morck et al., 1988). Consistent with earlier findings, we observe a positive and 
significant relation between MSO and leverage when MSO is below 25%. This association 
becomes negative when MSO is above 25%. Since the distribution of MSO is skewed to the 
right (see Table 1), the positive relation between MSO and leverage dominates our UK sample. 
Put differently, the piecewise linear regression result provides strong empirical evidence that 
supports interest alignment theory. It implies that only a small proportion of UK managers with 
considerably high ownership are entrenched and apt to lower debt levels in their own interests. 
 
We also examine the effect of institutional ownership on firm debt levels. As shown in all the 
models, the coefficients of the institutional variable are positive and statistically significant. 
This suggests that firms with higher institutional ownership are prone to hold more debt in their 
capital structure. Consistent with the argument of Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), concentrated 
institutional ownership effectively lowers the cost of debt capital through strong external 
monitoring. Further, the majority of UK institutional investors are financial firms. Their ready 
access to finance helps lower the cost of debt as well. Tufano (1996) provides another potential 
explanation: Most institutional shareholders invest in a variety of firms to diversify risk. They 
may thus be interested only in a firm’s short-term performance. Hence, to attract outside 
institutions, firms may raise capital via debt financing to adopt investment strategies that meet 
institutional investors’ requirements. 
 
With regard to other important firm characteristics, the results in Table 3 further demonstrate 
that firms with more tangible assets are more likely to raise debt in their capital structure, 
consistent with the findings of Friend and Lang (1988) and Jensen et al. (1992). The regression 
results indicate that profitable firms are more likely to increase their debt levels, consistent with 
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our prediction. Moreover, as a proxy for firm growth opportunities, sales growth also 
negatively affects firm debt levels. A survey investigating trade-off theory finds that firm 
growth increases the cost of financial distress, diminishes the free cash flow problem, and 
exacerbates the agency cost of debt (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Hence firms with more growth 
opportunities are less likely to raise debt. 
 
We also discover that the coefficient of the non-debt tax shield is positive and significant at the 
10% level, which is in line with the argument of Moh’d et al. (1995). These authors regard 
depreciation as the primary component of the non-debt tax shield and posit that higher 
depreciation charges represent a higher level of tangibility, which implies a higher collateral 
value for the firm; thus the capacity for debt rises. Another important finding is that the 
coefficient of Crisis is positive and significant, suggesting that UK firm debt levels were 
higher during the financial crisis period compared with other periods. 
(Please insert Table 3 here) 
 
4.2. Ownership, Market Valuation, and Financing Decisions 
 
Thus far, we have shown that the ownership structure of UK firms is non-monotonically related 
to capital structure. We now examine the effect of ownership on the external financing activity 
of firms in terms of two aspects: issue type and offer size. Plainly, issuing public debt increases 
firm debt levels, while issuing equity decreases leverage ratios. Furthermore, a larger security 
issuance offer strengthens such effects. However, it is unclear from the literature whether and to 
what degree the external financing decisions of firms are affected by their ownership structure. 
Therefore, our analysis aims to establish a link between ownership structure and the external 
financing decisions of firms. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of regressing ownership on issue 
choice and offer size for 1,202 issues, a combination of 772 bond and 530 equity issues from 
1998 to 2012. 
 
In Table 4, we use a binary dependent variable that takes the value of one for equity issues and 
zero for bond issues. In addition to the two ownership structure measures, our models also 
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include the determinants of bond–equity choice considered important in earlier empirical work 
(Frank and Goyal, 2007, 2009; Morck et al., 1988).  
 
First, as shown in Table 4, the coefficient of MSO is positive and significant at the 1% level. 
This finding suggests that an increase in MSO is associated with a higher likelihood of issuing 
equity over debt. Combined with the results in Table 3, we can summarize that firms with low 
levels of MSO are prone to issue bonds instead of equity, leading to increased leverage. 
Nevertheless, firms with higher MSO tend to choose equity financing over bonds, resulting in 
reduced leverage. This empirical result also supports the interest alignment hypothesis of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and managerial entrenchment theory (Jensen, 1986). In addition, 
Table 5 shows that the equity issue offer size is negatively related to the level of MSO. This 
result supports the control hypothesis, that controlling shareholders are more likely to 
decrease the size of equity issue to maintain their control. We also find that high-MSO firms 
are more likely to reduce their bond size, supporting managerial risk aversion (Friend and 
Lang, 1988) and managerial entrenchment theory (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Second, Table 4 also shows that firms with concentrated institutional ownership are less likely 
to issue bonds over equity across three estimations, which is contrary to our hypothesis. 
However, Table 5 reports that institutional ownership has a significant and positive effect on 
bond proceeds. This suggests that firms with high institutional ownership tend to maximize 
their offer size if they issue bonds to finance. One explanation may be that higher institutional 
ownership leads to lower bond yields and higher ratings on new bond issues (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003). Thus the proceeds of new bonds are likely to be maximized. The results also 
explain the positive relation between institutional OC and leverage. That is, firm with high 
institutional holdings will maximize bond size, even if they choose to issue equity over bonds. 
Another possible explanation is that firms with institutional holdings prefer other types of 
debt financing besides bonds, such as private debt and bank loans, as confirmed by 
subsequent empirical results. 
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Third, Model 1 in Table 4 further shows that the coefficient of the current market is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that favorable market conditions increase the 
probability of equity issues, while an unfavorable market increases the probability of bond 
issues. This finding supports the previous literature (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Bayless and 
Chaplinsky, 1996), which states that firms prefer raise equity capital under favorable current 
market conditions. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argue that a hot market is a sign of a positive 
shock to a firm’s expected profits. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) demonstrate that a hot 
market offers a window of opportunity for seasoned equity issues because the asymmetric 
information and adverse selection costs should be lower then. 
 
To investigate the specific role of current market valuation on the relation between ownership 
and the external funding decisions of firms, we construct two binary variables, Hot and Cold, 
representing hot and cold stock market periods, respectively. Then we develop two interaction 
terms between MSO and stock market valuation in the regressions: MSO*Hot and MSO*Cold. 
As reported in Model 1 of Table 4, the results of the effect of MSO and the current market on 
financing decisions are consistent with earlier findings. The coefficient of the interaction term 
MSO*Hot is positive and statistically significant, implying that a hot market increases the 
probability of high-MSO firms choosing equity over bond issues. The results of Model 3 show 
that the interaction variable MSO*Cold is negative and significant at the 1% level, which 
indicates that a cold market weakens the likelihood of a high-MSO firm issuing equity over 
bonds. These empirical results strongly support market timing theory. However, they also 
show market valuation has no impact on the relation between institutional OC and financial 
decisions. 
 
Fourth, other controlling variables in Table 4 also have a significant impact on a firm’s external 
financing choices. The result suggests that greater tangibility increases the probability of firms 
choosing bonds over equity, supporting the findings of Friend and Lang (1988) and Jensen et al. 
(1992). The positive coefficient of profitability indicates that firms with higher retained 
earnings are more likely to issue equity than bonds. At the same time, firms with higher growth 
opportunities, measured by sales growth, also tend to issue equity over bonds. However, the 
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dividend coefficient suggests that firms with higher cash dividend payments have more 
incentives to issue bonds over equity, consistent with pecking order theory. Additionally, the 
coefficient of the non-debt tax shield indicates that firms with higher depreciation charges tend 
to raise equity capital over public debt, supporting the argument of DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980). Finally, the financial crisis is found to have increased the probability of choosing 
equity over bonds. This implies that equity financing is more favorable for firms in financial 
distress than bond issues are. 
 
Fifth, we further examine the effect of other determinants on offer size in Table 5. The level of 
debt is positively related to the size of equity issues because firms tend to decrease leverage by 
larger amounts of equity. These results show that high-tangibility firms tend to increase the 
proceeds of bond issues relative to the proceeds of equity offerings. This implies that firms with 
higher levels of tangible assets are expected to have a lower cost of debt because they have 
more collateral to offer. The market-to-book ratio, sales growth, and dividend have a positive 
effect on the proceeds of equity, which implies that managers tend to time the stock market to 
issue equity. Moreover, it is found that firms are more likely to increase the size of equity 
issue and raise fewer bonds when the market is favorable, in line with market timing theory. 
The results also reveal that rights-preserving offers are larger than non–rights-preserving 
issues. Finally, credit rating, a significant determinant of bond size, has a significantly positive 
effect, consistent with the findings of Denis and Mihov (2003). 
 (Please insert Tables 4 and 5 here) 
 
Our previous empirical analysis explores the impact of ownership on capital structure and 
financing decisions. However, some studies argue that ownership is an endogenous variable 
and thereby ownership may not affect firm debt levels but can be influenced by them (e.g., 
Demsetz, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). To address this issue, we use a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) model to further examine whether different levels of debt prompt 
shareholders to adjust their holdings and whether the choice of external financing leads to 
changes in ownership. 
 
24 
Following previous studies related to ownership, we use firm size, operational risk, and R&D 
as instrumental variables of ownership. All instruments are tested for the endogeneity/validity 
of 2SLS (partial F-test, Hausman–Wu test) and over-identification (Sargan statistic), as 
recommended by Larcker and Rusticus (2010). Our results confirm that the three chosen 
instruments are appropriate for our models. In both Tables 6 and 7, the results from Model 1 
are consistent with the OLS results in Table 3 and. Model 2 suggests that a high leverage 
reduces managerial ownership. This result confirms the argument that managers are unwilling 
to invest too much of their personal wealth in a firm with high levels of debt because of the 
increased non-diversifiable risk of bankruptcy to the managers themselves. The finding in 
Model 3 also indicates that institutions are likely to invest in firms with less debt. As shown 
in Table 7, the coefficient of the equity variable is insignificant, implying that equity issuance 
has no impact on MSO or institutional OC. 
 
Among the exogenous ownership variables, the results show that size is negatively linked to 
MSO and institutional OC. This finding implies that larger firms are more likely to have a 
lower level of MSO or institutional OC, consistent with the study of Bathala (1996). 
Operational risk plays a negative role, indicating that shareholders are more likely to decrease 
holdings when market volatility is high. Moreover, the coefficient of the R&D variable has a 
negative sign. This is also consistent with the argument of Mahrt-Smith (2005), that is, a firm 
making a long-term investment decreases the share of cash flow rights, associated with lower 
MSO or institutional OC. 
(Please insert Tables 6 and 7 here) 
 
The earlier research focuses on the choice between equity and public issues of straight debt, 
that is, bonds. Within the class of debt financing, however, firms also use private debt, for 
example, bank loans and revolving credit facilities. To address this type of debt financing, we 
use the net debt issue to categorize whether a firm issues debt. Similar to Hovakimian et al. 
(2001), we define firms that issue debt as those whose net debt issue exceeds 5%. Here, net 
debt issue is calculated as long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus 
changes in current debt divided by total assets (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). As such, the net 
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debt issue comprises both public debt and private debt. Similarly, firms are defined as issuing 
equity when net equity issue
9
 is over 5%. After excluding issuers who issue both equity and 
debt in a given year, we have 2,515 issues classified from 4,137 yearly firm observations, 
including 768 net equity issues and 1,747 net debt issues. 
 
By using different definitions of debt and equity issue, we conduct robustness tests to 
examine the impact of ownership on the choice between equity and debt and on the amount of 
issuance. Table 8 reveals interesting findings: Firms with high institutional holding are more 
likely to issue debt over equity and they tend to increase the amount of debt. These results are 
consistent with the findings in Table 3, that institutional OC is positively related to debt. 
However, Table 4 shows that an increase in institutional OC is associated with a higher 
probability of issuing equity over bonds. The combined results of Tables 4 and 8 imply that 
firms with larger institutional holdings prefer private debt to equity. By contrast, public bonds 
are the last choice for these firms. This is consistent within the context where some 
institutional shareholders are banks that could force firms to borrow from them (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). 
(Please insert Tables 8 here) 
 
As we found earlier, high-MSO firms are less likely to choose a bond issue over equity 
because of the increased default risk. Such firms are more likely to decrease the size of their 
equity issue. This finding is explained by the controlling shareholders’ concerns about 
maintaining control. However, not all of the equity issued dilutes control. To address this 
issue and enhance our argument, we further highlight the distinction between rights- and non–
rights-preserving methods of raising equity capital. 
 
In Table 9, we construct a dummy variable, Rights-preserving, for our analysis that takes the 
value of one for a rights or open offer and zero for a placing or a combination of a placing and 
an open offer. We further examine whether ownership can influence the choice between rights- 
and non–rights-preserving methods of equity issuance and whether ownership has an impact on 
                                                 
9 The definition of net equity issue is provided in the Appendix. 
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the choice between rights-preserving equity and bond issues. The results show that, since firms 
with high MSO and high institutional OC have to raise money through external financing, a 
rights-preserving equity issue will be their first choice, a non–rights-preserving issue is next, 
and a bond issue last. This implies that controlling shareholders are more concerned about the 
increased bankruptcy risk brought about by the bonds than the loss of control through the 
equity issue. These results are consistent with the earlier finding in Table 5. We also find that, 
of the three financing methods, firms are most likely to choose the rights-preserving issue, 
since they need to raise more capital. 
(Please insert Tables 9 here) 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This study extends our knowledge of capital structure in the following ways. First, it stresses 
the importance of the relation between ownership and leverage ratio in the UK context. Our 
analysis uses two major proxies for ownership: MSO and institutional ownership. Our 
empirical results show a non-monotonic relation between MSO and the debt ratio. At lower 
MSO levels, the relation with leverage is positive, supporting interest alignment theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). This is because higher managerial ownership plays an important role in 
aligning the interests of corporate managers and shareholders, leading to lower costs of debt. 
In this case, firms are likely to raise more debt, resulting in higher debt. However, this relation 
becomes negative for a small proportion of higher-MSO firms, which can be explained by the 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Corporate managers who own 
high percentages of firm shares are in a better position to protect their private interests from the 
risk of bankruptcy associated with a high leverage ratio. Our finding is consistent with the 
studies of Brailsford et al. (2002) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009). 
 
Interestingly, we find that institutional ownership has a homogeneously positive effect on firm 
leverage ratios, although a high degree of institutional ownership decreases the probability of 
issuing bonds over equity. Our results provide two explanations: First, high institutional OC 
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firms have an incentive to issue more bonds and less equity. Second, such firms are more 
likely to turn to other types of debt as financing channels. 
 
Second, we further examine the impact of ownership structure on the external financing 
decisions of firms. Our empirical results strongly suggest that higher-MSO firms prefer to issue 
equity to bonds to avoid the risk of bankruptcy and maintain their corporate control. We also 
consider the role of current market valuation in the choice of security issuances. Consistent 
with previous findings (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), firms raise 
new seasoned equity when the market is favorable; otherwise, they are more likely to choose a 
bond issue. Further, we tie stock market valuations to the relation between MSO and a firm’s 
external financing activities. We find that a hot market increases the probability of firms with 
greater managerial ownership choosing equity over bond issues. At the same time, a cold 
market decreases the probability that firms with greater MSO issue equity over bonds. In 
summary, the empirical evidence confirms such intuition, that firms, on average, time current 
market valuations when they plan to raise external financing. 
 
Third, this study also addresses the role of the financial crisis in the external financing 
decisions of firms. We find UK firms chose equity over bonds during the financial crisis, 
providing strong evidence for the market timing theory and the risk aversion hypothesis. 
 
We note that our research highlights MSO and institutional ownership as proxies of ownership 
structure. Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data, we do not take into account 
institutional shareholder types, although they play a vital role in ownership structure. For the 
same reasons, it is unclear how institutional differences affect firm capital structure decisions.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Full Sample 
This table reports key descriptive statistics of the sample of 383 UK listed companies, Panel A providing firm observations for 
different levels of MSO and Panel B providing firm observations for different periods, excluding financials and utilities. All firm 
observations are yearly, based on the period from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. Panel A reveals the means, standard 
deviations, medians, and 25th and 75th percentiles of firm characteristics for the full sample. In Panel B, MSO is categorized as 
low, under 5%; medium, 5–25%; and high, over 25%.  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the 383 sample firms 
Variables Mean St. Dev. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile No. of Obs. 
MSO (%) 9.046 11.519 3.500 4.600 8.330 4138 
Institutional OC (%) 32.634 19.613 17.610 31.530 46.400 4137 
Leverage (Market) 
(%) 
26.639 21.211 8.320 23.100 42.180 4138 
Leverage (Book) (%) 29.174 32.189 6.193 19.523 52.799 4138 
Tangibility (%) 53.175 26.188 32.500 49.179 77.992 4138 
Profitability (%) 33.688 53.349 9.501 20.009 60.167 4138 
M/B ratio (%) 2.279 2.341 0.890 1.470 2.730 4138 
Sales growth (%) 13.276 36.740 -1.141 7.990 20.337 4138 
Dividend (%) 37.986 31.916 0.021 36.610 60.950 4138 
Non-debt tax shield 
(%) 
2.155 2.746 0.001 1.349 3.404 4137 
MV (£, millions) 1246.120 2072.100 168.970 406.270 1251.690 4138 
Operational risk (%) 0.043 0.078 0.008 0.021 0.048 4138 
R&D (%) 3.149 6.582 0.000 0.580 3.770 4138 
Panel B: Firm observations with different MSO levels  
 
Low MSO (0–5%) Medium MSO (5–25%) High MSO (>25%) 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
MSO (%) 3.695 0.516 7.955 2.394 32.999 16.201 
Institutional OC (%) 33.614 19.455 35.717 19.618 21.656 16.255 
Leverage (Market)(%) 26.708 20.911 28.306 21.975 22.559 20.096 
Leverage (Book)(%) 24.486 32.111 40.539 35.000 21.157 26.071 
       Tangibility (%) 57.912 27.896 45.860 22.428 50.857 22.735 
Profitability (%) 40.507 54.551 24.711 44.114 26.818 63.029 
M/B ratio (%) 1.946 2.015 2.571 2.543 2.949 2.806 
Sales growth (%) 11.666 37.627 14.943 34.346 15.931 38.141 
Dividend (%) 41.074 34.829 33.973 26.808 34.757 29.002 
Non-debt tax shield (%) 1.704 2.380 2.763 3.056 2.559 3.017 
       MV (£, millions) 1582.630 2407.810 928.893 1609.610 620.051 1038.850 
Operational risk (%) 0.034 0.053 0.048 0.094 0.065 0.110 
R&D (%) 2.634 5.701 3.419 7.619 4.806 6.917 
                            N 2226 1329 582 
% 53.807 32.125 14.068 
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Table 2. Distributions and Firm Characteristics of Bond and Equity Issues 
Panel A presents the distributions of 772 equity issues and 530 bond issues by year. Panel B presents the firm characteristics for the 
samples of equity and bond issues respectively, excluding financials and utilities. All issues are from January 1, 1998, to December 
31, 2012. Here Annual Proceeds is the sum of proceeds in one year and Average Proceeds is the average of proceeds in one year. 
The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, for the t-test of the 
difference in means between equity and bond issues. 
Panel A: Equity and bond issue distributions 
 
Equity Issue Bond Issue 
Year N Annual Proceeds Average Proceeds N Annual Proceeds Average Proceeds 
1998 20 2679.400 133.970 7 3665.160 523.594 
1999 24 3245.16 135.215 31 23455.13 756.617 
2000 56 19697.350 351.738 40 30183.920 754.598 
2001 69 23292.910 346.810 37 8048.050 217.515 
2002 51 14800.270 290.201 47 14227.410 302.711 
2003 60 12355.530 205.925 48 19268.350 401.424 
2004 52 10073.300 193.717 27 5685.270 210.566 
2005 53 7146.930 134.848 18 4436.650 246.481 
2006 36 4068.060 113.002 61 12195.110 199.920 
2007 53 37485.571 707.278 54 15941.150 295.206 
2008 28 24597.980 878.499 41 11916.080 290.636 
2009 177 107234.360 605.844 37 9277.350 250.739 
2010 45 25790.070 573.113 27 3305.320 122.419 
2011 29 3243.210 111.835 31 5185.830 167.285 
2012 19 4806.850 252.992 24 4902.990 204.291 
Total 772 300,516.951 
 
530 171,693.770 
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Panel B: Firm characteristics for bond and equity issues 
 
Equity Issues (N = 772) Bond Issues (N = 530) 
Difference in Means 
Variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Proceeds (£, millions) 318.108 396.088 365.076 410.168 -46.968a 
Proceeds/MV (%) 0.364 0.676 0.073 0.175 0.291a 
MSO (%) 9.101 10.783 5.946 6.237 3.155a 
Institutional OC (%) 35.323 25.309 28.38 25.712 6.943a 
Leverage (Market) (%) 38.562 25.576 38.693 20.342 -0.131a 
Tangibility (%) 36.560 24.431 40.421 19.936 -3.862a 
Profitability (%) 16.756 60.946 16.358 15.706 0.398a 
M/B ratio (%) 3.205 5.037 3.974 9.062 -0.769a 
Sales growth (%) 20.248 41.192 12.639 24.757 7.609a 
Dividend (%) 28.425 28.907 39.711 25.759 -11.346a 
Non-debt tax shield (%) 2.509 2.897 3.155 2.075 -0.646a 
Current market (%) 4.162 0.556 3.957 0.510 0.205a 
Crisis 0.392 
 
0.300 
  
Rights-preserving 0.171 
    
Credit rating 
  
0.365 
  
MV (£, millions) 1998.530 2418.350 3446.62 3163.970 -1448.090a 
Operational risk (%) 6.447 10.323 4.194 4.380 2.250a 
R&D (%) 3.440 8.205 1.931 3.855 1.509a 
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Table 3. Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm Capital Structure 
This table reports the estimates of several OLS regressions of firm leverage levels on ownership measures and a series of control 
variables over the period from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. Models 2 and 4 are piecewise linear specifications in MSO 
such that (1) MSO (0–5%) is equal to MSO when MSO is lower than 5% and it is equal to 5% otherwise; (2) MSO (5–25%) is equal 
to zero if MSO is lower than 5% and, when MSO is in the range 5–25%, MSO (5–25%) is equal to MSO minus 5%; otherwise, 
MSO (5–25%) is equal to 25%; and (3) MSO (>25%) is equal to zero if MSO is lower than 25%; when MSO is over 25%, MSO 
(>25%) is equal to MSO minus 25%. All independent variables are lagged with respect to the dependent variable. All regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dependent Variables Leverage (Market) Leverage (Book) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 6.311a 6.146a 3.615a 3.127a 
MSO 7.223b  1.621a  
MSO2 -0.277a  -0.051a  
MSO (0–5%)  3.798a  3.685a 
MSO (5–25%)  -2.918a  -5.516a 
MSO (>25%)  -3.186a  -3.202a 
Institutional OC 0.222b 0.040a 0.207b 0.197a 
Tangibility 0.598a 0.590a 0.341a 0.363a 
Profitability 0.298a 0.303a 0.212a 0.123a 
M/B ratio -0.160 -0.152 -0.154 -0.127 
Sales growth -0.082b -0.086b -0.625a -0.616a 
Dividend 0.036 -0.026 -0.038c -0.036c 
Non-debt tax shield 0.436b 0.420a 0.305b 0.307a 
Crisis  1.040b 0.968a 1.184b 1.334a 
Adjusted R2 0.493 0.490 0.190 0.190 
N 4137 4137 4137 4137 
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Table 4. Impact of Ownership Structure on the Financing Decisions of Firms 
This table reports the estimates of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is binary variable that takes on the value of one 
if the issuer issues equity and zero for bond issues. The sample comprises 1,202 issues—772equity and 530 bond issues—from 
January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. All independent variables are for the year-end prior to issuance. All regressions include 
year and industry fixed effects. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -6.416a -3.511a -2.532a 
MSO 1.366a 1.320a 1.154a 
MSO*Hot   0.153a  
MSO*Cold    -0.951b 
Institutional OC 0.636a 0.378a 0.663a 
Institutional OC*Hot  o.338  
Institutional OC*Cold   -0.205 
Hot   0.504a  
Cold    -2.559a 
Current market 0.829a   
Proceeds/MV 0.158 0.182 0.160 
Leverage (Market) -0.287 -0.161 -0.169 
Tangibility -0.080c -0.818a -0.072 
Profitability 0.032b 0.068a 0.029b 
M/B ratio -0.068 -0.083 -0.013 
Sales growth 0.050b 0.052b 0.051b 
Dividend -0.098a -0.102a -0.104a 
Non-debt tax shield -0.128a -0.129a -0.136a 
Crisis 0.256a 0.363a 0.137a 
Adjusted R2 0.264 0.264 0.264 
N 1202 1202 1202 
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Table 5. Impact of Ownership on the Amount of Issuance Proceeds 
This table reports the estimates of several OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the amount of proceeds issued (scaled 
by the issuer’s market value for the year-end prior to issuance). The sample comprises 1,202 issues—772 equity and 530 bond 
issues—over the period from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. Model 1 examines the relation between ownership and the 
amount of equity issue proceeds, while Model 2 tests the impact of ownership on the amount of bond issue proceeds. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
Dependent Variable Equity Issue Proceeds Bond Issue Proceeds 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 1.330 1.446a 
MSO -0.191a -0.108c 
Institutional OC -0.157a 0.163b 
Leverage 0.309b 0.388 
Tangibility -0.381 0.584a 
Profitability -0.097 0.311 
M/B ratio 1.298b 0.736b 
Sales growth 0.179a 1.526 
Dividend 0.314b -0.499 
Non-debt tax shield -0.157 0.816 
Current market 1.637a -0.555b 
Rights 0.273a  
Credit rating  2.093b 
Crisis  0.938 1.337 
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.132 
N 772 530 
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Table 6. Simultaneous Equation Results for Ownership Structure and Capital Structure 
This table presents the results of a simultaneous panel of equations for ownership and firm capital structure using 2SLS 
regression. The sample contains 383 UK listed firms from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. The superscripts a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable Leverage (Market) MSO Institutional OC 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 6.628a 5.157a -5.085c 
Leverage  -0.076a 0.047b 
MSO 5.735a   
MSO2 -0.218c   
Institutional OC 0.417b   
Tangibility 0.779a   
Profitability 0.247a   
M/B ratio -0.017   
Sales growth -0.044b   
Dividend 0.057a   
Non-debt tax shield 0.814a   
Crisis  2.343a   
Size   -0.271a 0.204b 
Operational risk   -0.265b -0.089b 
R&D  -0.112c -0.017a 
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.277 0.173 
N 4137 4137 4137 
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Table 7. Simultaneous Equation Results or Ownership Structure and Financial Decisions 
This table presents the results of a simultaneous panel of equations for ownership and firm financial decisions using 2SLS 
regression. The sample comprises 1,202 issues—772equity and 530 bond issues—from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. 
The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable  Equity  MSO Institutional OC 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -0.687a 2.760a 7.101a 
Equity   0.084 -0.030 
MSO 0.214a   
Institutional OC 0.130a   
Current Market  0.632a   
Proceeds/MV -0.010   
Leverage (Market)  -0.059   
Tangibility -0.127b   
Profitability 0.060b   
M/B ratio -0.015   
Sales growth 0.090b   
Dividend -0.212a   
Non-debt tax shield -0.239a   
Crisis  0.540a   
Size   -0.764a -0.257a 
Operational risk   -0.415a -1.576a 
R&D  -0.165 -0.303 
Adjusted R2 0.200 0.139 0.266 
N 1202 1202 1202 
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Table 8. Impact of Ownership on the Choice between Equity and Debt and on the Amount of Issuance 
This table reports the impact of ownership on the choice of between equity and debt and on the amount of issuance. According to 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Hovakimian et al. (2001), the dependent variables in Model 1 are binary variables that take on the 
value of one when the net equity issue exceeds 5% and zero as the net debt issue exceeds 5%. Cases where firms issue both 
equity and debts in a given fiscal year are omitted. The dependent variables in Model 2 are the amounts of net equity issue. The 
dependent variable in Model 3 is the amounts of net debt issue. The sample comprises 2,515 issues with 768 net equity issues 
and 1,747 net debt issues from 1998 to 2012. All independent variables are for the year-end prior to issuance. All regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Dependent variable Equity vs. Debt Net Equity Issue Net Debt Issue 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 2.933a 2.007a 5.124b 
MSO 0.225a -0.418b -0.197c 
Institutional OC -0.141c -1.267a 0.440b 
Leverage (Market) 0.192a -0.963 -1.157 
Tangibility -0.141a -0.874a 1.011a 
Profitability 0.026b -0.284a 0.030 
M/B ratio 0.295 0.040 -0.234 
Sales growth 0.091a 0.261a 0.064 
Dividend -0.037a 0.270b -0.238a 
Non-debt tax shield -0.345 -0.184 -0 159 
Crisis  0.175c 0.393 0.151 
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.066 0.026 
N 2515 768 1747 
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Table 9. Impact of Ownership on Financing Decisions between a Rights Issue, a Non–Rights-Preserving Issue, and a Bond 
Issue 
This table reports the impact of ownership on the choice of alternative external financing, including a rights-preserving issue, a 
non–rights-preserving issue, and a bond issue. The dependent variable in Model 1 is a binary variable that takes on the value of one 
if the issuer chooses a rights-preserving equity issue and zero for a non–rights-preserving issue. The dependent variable in Model 2 
is a binary variable that takes on the value of one if the issuer chooses a non–rights-preserving equity issue and zero for bond issues. 
The dependent variable in Model 3 is a binary variable that takes on the value of one if the issuer chooses a rights-preserving equity 
issue and zero for a bond issue. The sample comprises 772 equity issues, with 132 rights-preserving issues, 630 non–rights 
preserving issues, and 530 bond issues from January 1, 1998, to December 31, 2012. All independent variables are for the year-end 
prior to issuance. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable Rights vs. Non-Rights Non-Rights vs. Bonds Rights vs. Bonds 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept -2.549a -1.966a -6.218a 
MSO 0.151c 0.722a 0.453
a
 
Institutional OC 0.096b 0.197a 0.267
a
 
Proceeds/MV 0.392a 0.838a 1.112
a
 
Tangibility  0.109c -0.140a -0.051 
Leverage (Market) 0.183a -0.074 0.193
b
 
Profitability -0.015 0.045a 0.047 
M/B ratio -0.339 0.026 -0.211 
Sales growth -0.089 0.059a 0.051 
Dividend -0.202 -0.135a -0.191
a
 
Non-debt tax shield 0.208 -0.127a -0.878
c
 
Current market -0.136 0.639a 0.876
a
 
Crisis  0.628b -0.117 0.800
b
 
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.367 0.363 
N 772 1170 662 
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Appendix: Variables Definitions 
 Definition Source 
Issuer characteristics 
Proceeds Gross proceeds. If missing, the data are constructed from the number of new shares 
times the offer price. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Proceeds/MV Ratio of proceeds over market valuation. Thomson One 
Banker 
Rights-preserving Dummy variable that takes the value of one for a rights-preserving equity issue, 
including a rights offer and an open offer, and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Credit rating  Dummy variable that takes the value of one for a firm whose Standard & Poor’s bond 
rating is above or equal to A- and zero if below. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Ownership characteristics 
MSO MSO, defined as the sum of the ownership of executive and non-executive directors. Thomson One 
Banker 
Institutional OC Aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s share stakes held by all institutional 
investors. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Firm characteristics 
Leverage (Book)  Ratio of the book value of total debt to total assets.  Datastream 
Leverage (Market) Ratio of total debt to the sum of book debt and the market value of equity. Datastream 
MV Market value of the issuer. Datastream 
Tangibility  Ratio of property, plant, and equipment over total assets. Datastream 
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization over total 
assets. 
Datastream 
M/B ratio  Ratio of the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market 
value of equity to the book value of assets. 
Datastream 
Sales growth Change in the logarithm of total assets. Datastream 
Dividend  Common dividend payout ratio. Datastream 
Non-debt tax shield Ratio of depreciation to total assets. Datastream 
Net equity issue  The change in book equity minus the change in balance sheet retained earnings 
divided by total assets.  
Datastream 
Net debt issue  The long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction plus changes in current 
debt divided by total assets.  
Datastream 
Market 
characteristics 
  
Current market  Measured as the three-month moving average of scaled equity issue volumes, where 
the scaled issue volume is the aggregate equity issue volume divided by the 
month-end value of outstanding equity for the London Stock Exchange. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Hot  Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the valuation of the current market 
is in the top 30% of the whole research period and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Cold  Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the valuation of the current market 
is in the bottom 30% of the whole research period and zero otherwise. 
Thomson One 
Banker 
Crisis  Dummy variable that takes the value of one when the issuance occurs between 
January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2009, and zero otherwise.  
Thomson One 
Banker 
Determinants of ownership 
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Size MV, as a natural logarithm. Datastream 
Operational risk Standard deviation of a firm’s profitability over the four previous years. Datastream 
R&D Ratio of R&D expenditure over total sales. Datastream 
 
